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Keynote Address: Untying the Moral
Knot of Abortion
Caitlin E. Borgmann∗
Abortion is commonly identified as one of the most
compelling moral issues of our time.1 Politicians and the media
describe the debate in dramatic terms, often referring to it as a
“war.”2 These theatrical descriptions have done a disservice to our
public conversation about abortion, in that they have functioned
as a “conversation stopper.”3 We assume that there are two sides,
that these two sides are far apart, and that they are irrevocably
entrenched. We are also led to believe that the key moral
question in the debate is the value of the embryo or fetus.4 I
argue that these perceptions are false. If we look beyond the
∗ Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. These remarks were presented
as a keynote address at the Symposium, Roe at 40—The Controversy Continues,
held at Washington and Lee School of Law on November 8, 2014. The author
thanks Carol Sanger for helpful conversations, and participants in a faculty
forum at CUNY School of Law for comments on an earlier version of this
address. The author is grateful to Dean Sam Calhoun and members of the
Washington and Lee Law Review for inviting her to present this address.
1. See, e.g., The Abortion War, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2012, 2:41 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2012/08/20128288841399701.h
tml (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (“Since it was legalised in 1973, the issue of
abortion has polarised the US . . . . Why is a medical procedure being reframed
as a deeply divisive moral issue in the US?”).
2. Id.; Robin Marty, The Next Battle in the Abortion Wars, POLITICO (Jan.
14,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/south-dakotaabortion-wars-103596.html#.Ux1aIdyZbZc (last visited Mar. 10, 2014) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the
Abortion Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 553 (2009) [hereinafter
Borgmann, The Meaning].
4. See, e.g., Bonnie Steinbock, Abortion, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 1–4 (Mary Crowley ed. 2008) (“The
central ethical question in the abortion debate is over the moral status of the
embryo and fetus.”), available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/
BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2400.
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hyperbole, we see that most people do not view the issue in such
stark terms. The public holds complex and sometimes
contradictory views about the morality of abortion. For most of
the public, abortion seems to present a muddle of potential moral
questions, and the most pressing among them apparently have
relatively little to do with the moral status of the embryo or fetus,
and much to do with judgments about women’s appropriate
behavior and their proper role in society.5
These subtleties do not make for exciting news headlines.
But they are critical for us to understand. We cannot know
whether a given abortion restriction makes sense if we do not
know what societal problem or moral evil it aims to ameliorate.
Today, I want to begin to untangle the moral knot of abortion so
that we can try to have an honest conversation about what is
really at stake. In the end, I will argue, the moral aspect of
abortion that we should see codified in law is a woman’s dignity
and autonomy in making her own decision about the fate of her
pregnancy and, thereby, her life. I conclude that this concept of
autonomy is far better protected by the Roe v. Wade6 decision
than by the undue burden standard of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.7
In the summer of 2013, Texas passed a controversial new set
of abortion restrictions, some of which have been challenged in
federal court.8 The federal district judge’s opinion in the case
described the abortion debate in the dramatic terms we typically
find in the media and in political discourse. Judge Yeakel wrote:
Today there is no issue that divides the people of this country
more than abortion. It is the most divisive issue to face this
country since slavery. When compared with the intensity,
emotion, and depth of feeling expressed with regard to
abortion, the recent arguments on affordable healthcare,
5. E.g., David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood
v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1886
(1995); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,
356 (1992).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
8. See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, No. 1:13-CV-862-LY, 2013 WL 5781583 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 28,
2013), rev’d in part No. 13-51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014).
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increasing the debt ceiling, and closing the government retreat
to near oblivion.9

This statement should give us pause. Is the country really this
exercised over abortion? Is the issue more divisive than
segregation? Than the internment of Japanese-Americans? Than
red baiting? Than the Vietnam War? When Texas Governor Rick
Perry convened a special legislative session to consider the
omnibus abortion legislation,10 a poll showed that eighty percent
of Texas voters did not want abortion to be raised during the
special session, sixty-three percent said the state has enough
restrictions on abortion, and seventy-one percent thought that
the Governor and the legislature should be more focused on the
economy and jobs.11 Judge Yeakel’s description is clearly
hyperbole, yet this kind of hyperbole about abortion is so common
that we often take it for granted.
It is also irresponsible and unhelpful. For decades, the media
and politicians have grown accustomed to describing the abortion
debate as a heated battle that divides the country.12 And while
this black-and-white portrayal does not depict reality, the public
seems drawn to its simplicity. The abortion debate has fallen prey
to the more general phenomenon of news as entertainment.13 We
9. Id. at *1.
10. See Josh Rubin, After Divisive Debate, Texas Senate Approves
Restrictive
Abortion
Measure,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/
politics/texas-abortion-measure/ (last updated July 23, 2013) (last visited Jan. 8,
2014) (explaining that the Texas governor called a “second special session” of the
state legislature to consider the abortion bill) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
11. Texas Voters Oppose Governor Perry’s Omnibus Abortion Bill,
GREENBERG QUINLAN ROSNER RES. (June 20, 2013), http://gqrr.com/
articles/2013/06/20/texas-voters-oppose-governor-perry-s-omnibus-abortion-bill/
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Texas Voters] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, State Battles Over Abortion and Family
(May
27,
2011,
1:59
PM),
Planning
Heating
Up,
NPR.ORG
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/05/27/136717917/state-battles-over-abort
ion-and-family-planning-heat-up (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (“The national
debate on abortion continues on a high boil in several states.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? ix (2005); Jack M. Balkin,
How Mass Media Simulate Political Transparency 3 (Yale Law Sch. Legal
Scholarship
Repository,
Paper
No.
259,
1999),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1258&context=fs
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are more captivated by what Jack Balkin calls the “sporting
elements of political conflict”14—the battles, the winners and
losers, the polarization—than by the substantive aspects of public
policy.15 Indeed, viewing the abortion battle as hopelessly
intractable relieves us from having to grapple with the more
difficult questions of what the public actually believes and what
that means for abortion policy.
Before turning to a closer examination of the public’s actual
views on abortion, we might ask why it is that we do not typically
have this conversation. The problem is, in part, that the public
debate is dominated by politicians and advocates, none of whom
seem particularly interested in focusing on the messy middle of
public opinion.16
Pro-life activists have no interest in highlighting the gulf
between their own extreme views and the views of the public.
They prefer to gloss over these differences with the vague but
appealing term “life.” I have referred to the term “life” as a
Rorschach inkblot—its meaning is in the eye of the beholder.17
“Life” looks at the issue with a soft focus lens, obscuring the clear
moral lines that might offend or alienate the public. The term
appeals to people because we are never forced to pin down what it
means: Does it mean the embryo is just like a person, and
therefore that abortion is murder? Or does it merely mean that
the embryo is biologically alive? Does it mean the embryo has the
potential to become a person who has a meaningful life, with the
kinds of emotional attachments and commitments we associate
with our own lives? The soft-focus lens of the term “life” allows
the pro-life movement to avoid staking out a specific moral
position. This rhetoric does not clarify the moral aspect of
abortion at all—indeed, that is its very point.
Abortion rights advocates, on the other hand, often think
that it’s possible to “bracket” the moral question of abortion, as

s_papers&sei-redir=1.
14. Balkin, supra note 13, at 3.
15. See id.
16. See FIORINA, supra note 13, at ix.
17. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of
Truth for the Anti-Abortion Rights Movement, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245,
246–47 (2013) [hereinafter Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th].
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Thomas Nagel has put it.18 They prefer not to have a conversation
about the moral status of the embryo because they want people to
be able to make up their own minds about it.19 As a result, they
do not challenge the meaning or consistency of a person’s
statement that “life begins at conception.” Rather, they tend to
simply say, it’s fine for you to believe that, but don’t impose it on
other people.
Unfortunately, the public is not too interested in having its
own views examined in detail either. The black-and-white
depiction of abortion as a fierce battle is a much simpler and
more fascinating story. And the images the media feeds us seem
to support its validity. The news coverage features impassioned
politicians and advocates who state their positions in stark, easyto-grasp terms. We see images of fervent protestors with signs,
and we watch fury against abortion translate to violence when
abortion providers are murdered.
In fact, though, most Americans do not align themselves with
either side in this abortion “war.”20 Decades of polling show that
the black-and-white depiction of the abortion debate is not
accurate. In 2012, the American Enterprise Institute published a
public opinion study that summarized polling data on abortion
from 1975 to 2011.21 The study concluded that “[o]pinion on
abortion has been very stable . . . . [I]t is also deeply
ambivalent.”22 While substantial numbers agree with the
statement, “abortion is murder,” there is broad support for the
idea that abortion should be the woman’s decision.23 The
researchers found that the majority of Americans do not want
Roe v. Wade to be overturned, but they favor restrictions on
18. Thomas Nagel, Progressive but Not Liberal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 25,
2006), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/25/progressive-butnot-liberal/?page=1 (last visited Jan. 13, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
19. See Borgmann, The Meaning, supra note 3, at 555.
20. See FIORINA, supra note 13, at 34, 52–54 (arguing that the common
claim of American polarization over the issue of abortion is false).
21. KARLYN BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST., ATTITUDES ABOUT
ABORTION 2 (2012), http://www.aei.org/files/2012/01/20/-attitudes-about-abortion39-years-of-polling_131350993384.pdf (compiling and summarizing polling
results on abortion since Roe v. Wade).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 3–6.

1304

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299 (2014)

abortion, including notification of spouses, parental consent,
twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and bans on publicly funded
abortions.24
We need to look more closely at what seems to motivate the
public’s views on abortion, including the restrictions it appears to
support. Good public policy demands a clear understanding of the
problem it is supposed to address. Once we understand what
problem the public wants fixed, we can assess questions like
whether that justification can validly support a law restricting
women’s autonomy, whether it is based on a sound factual
foundation, and whether the proposed restriction actually
furthers its objective.
Polls consistently show that Americans do not want to ban
abortion, although they do support many restrictions on it.25 It is
not just polling data that demonstrate the public’s unwillingness
to ban abortion. Even states like Mississippi and South Dakota,
which have led the nation in passing onerous and creative new
abortion restrictions, have not been able to get voters to approve
embryonic personhood measures or abortion bans through ballot
initiatives.26 It is perhaps even an open question whether the
public would, if asked to vote directly, support many of the less
extreme restrictions we are seeing passed today. The Texas
omnibus bill was highly unpopular, according to polls.27
Similarly, so-called “partial-birth abortion” bans were perceived
to have broad public support.28 But on the few occasions when the
24. Id. at 17–18, 20–21.
25. Id. at 2.
26. See Mississippi Life Begins at the Moment of Fertilization Amendment,
Initiative 26 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Life_
Begins_at_the_Moment_of_Fertilization_Amendment,_Initiative_26_(2011) (last
visited Jan. 12, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Mississippi residents voted
against a ballot measure defining life as beginning at conception) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); South Dakota Abortion Ban, Initiated
Measure 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_
Abortion_Ban,_Initiated_Measure_11_(2008) (last visited Jan. 12, 2014)
(reporting that a majority of South Dakota citizens voted against a ban on
abortion that contained only a few exceptions) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
27. See Texas Voters, supra note 11 (reporting that a majority of Texas
voters believed the state already had enough restrictions on abortion and that
the state government’s efforts should be devoted to other problems).
28. BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 19.
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public was invited to weigh in directly on the issue via ballot
initiatives, voters rejected the bans.29 Nevertheless, polls do show
that the public supports, at least in theory, restrictions like
parental involvement laws, waiting periods, and funding bans.30
What might account for this?
The public’s opposition to abortion bans, coupled with its
support for lesser restrictions, shows that the public does not
view an embryo or fetus as a person, or abortion as murder.
Polling results confirm this, especially as to the early stages of
pregnancy. For example, most Americans are morally
unconcerned with the destruction of embryos in contexts other
than abortion. Large majorities of the public in a recent Pew
Research Center poll thought that non-abortion procedures that
involve the destruction of embryos, including embryonic stem cell
research and in vitro fertilization, are either morally acceptable
or are not a moral issue at all.31 And even as to later stages of

29. See, e.g., Colorado Partial-Birth Abortion Act (1998), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Partial-Birth_Abortion_Act_(1998) (last visited
Jan. 8, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Colorado citizens voted against a
“partial-birth abortion” ban) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Maine Partial-Birth Abortion Initiative, Question 1 (1999), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Maine_Partial-Birth_Abortion_Initiative,_Question_1_
(1999) (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (reporting that a majority of Maine citizens
voted against a “partial-birth abortion” ban) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
30. BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 17–18, 20–21.
31. See Abortion Viewed in Moral Terms: Fewer See Stem Cell Research
and IVF as Moral Issues, PEW RES. CENTER (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/08/15/abortion-viewed-in-moral-terms/
(last
visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Abortion Viewed in Moral Terms] (showing
that only 22% of the United States adult population believes embryonic stem
cell research is morally wrong and only 12% believes in-vitro fertilization is
morally wrong, the rest believing these procedures are morally acceptable or not
a moral issue at all) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In vitro
fertilization (IVF) in the United States nearly always entails creating extra
human embryos (that is, inseminating more eggs than will be transferred in a
given cycle). See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Embryo Disposal Practices in IVF
Clinics in the United States, 22 POL. & LIFE SCI. 4, 6 (2004), available at
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=bioethics_
papers (explaining that 97% of the IVF clinics studied create extra embryos).
While practices at IVF clinics vary, the vast majority of clinics that create excess
embryos dispose of at least some of these. See id. (explaining that 94% of clinics
studies practiced some form of embryo disposal).

1306

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1299 (2014)

pregnancy, the public supports abortion in circumstances that
would appear incompatible with viewing a fetus as a person.32
What then could be driving the public’s support of abortion
restrictions? One could say that the public believes that embryos
and fetuses have value, just not as much value as a person. This
would mean that the state’s power to protect them might be
outweighed in certain circumstances. Certainly this could explain
why the public would tolerate or support some restrictions. But
the embryo’s moral value does not change depending on the
woman’s reasons for obtaining an abortion. Therefore, we still
must account for how the public distinguishes among those
considerations that outweigh the embryo or fetus’s right to exist
and those that do not. This is especially so when it comes to
restrictions on early abortions since the public apparently places
relatively low value on embryonic life, as evidenced by its lack of
concern for the destruction of embryos in other contexts.
Virtually all of the common restrictions states have imposed
on abortion since Roe are the product of a pro-life movement
strategy to dismantle the right to abortion one incremental step
at a time.33 A major goal of the incrementalist strategy has been
to create public disfavor for abortion by making it disfavored in
the law. Thus, movement leaders have supported measures like
requiring parental involvement in minors’ abortion decisions or
making women wait twenty-four hours before getting an
abortion.34 Incremental restrictions are designed to insidiously
chip away at the constitutional right to abortion. They are
usually promoted under some other justification than stopping
abortions, such as protecting women’s health.35 There are two
possible reasons why the general public may support such
32. See, e.g., Abortion Poll Finds Support for 20-Week Ban, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 11, 2013, 7:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
07/11/abortion-poll_n_3575551.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 245–47
(discussing this strategy); Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E.
Coleson, Attorneys at Law, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, to Whom It May Concern
(Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with the author) (same).
34. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 245; see also
Memorandum from Bopp & Coleson, supra note 33 (justifying support for these
measures).
35. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (discussing TRAP laws).
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incremental restrictions. One is that people may be misled into
thinking that the stated justifications are sincere and are
grounded in fact. The other is that their support is influenced by
the black-and-white rhetoric that abortion is wrong. Let us
consider each in turn.
Most incremental restrictions are premised on some implicit
or explicit factual assumption about abortion, women, or abortion
providers. For example, parental notice requirements imply that
most teens do not voluntarily talk to their parents about abortion,
and that a law will make them more likely to do it. In fact, both of
these assumptions are false.36 Similarly, so-called “informed
consent” requirements are often justified on the grounds that
abortion is physically dangerous because, for example, it causes
breast cancer or increases a woman’s risk of suicide.37 Neither of
these assertions is backed up by science.38 Moreover, abortion is
one of the safest medical procedures, with 0.3% of patients in the
United States experiencing a major complication.39 Targeted
36. See UCSF BIXBY CTR. FOR GLOBAL REPROD. HEALTH, ADOLESCENTS AND
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION FOR ABORTION 2 (2008), http://bixbycenter.ucsf.edu/
publications/files/ParentalNotification_2008Sep.pdf (summarizing studies and
explaining that 61% of girls in states without parental involvement laws involve
at least one parent in their abortion decisions, and that “[t]here is no evidence
that a government mandate will positively increase the frequency or quality of
communication” between parents and daughters).
37. See, e.g., Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion
Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 11 (2007), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
gpr/10/4/gpr100406.pdf (noting that six states refer to a possible higher breast
cancer risk and four states indicate the risk of “experience[ing] suicidal
thoughts” or “suffer[ing] from ‘postabortion traumatic stress syndrome’” in
materials given to those considering an abortion as part of “informed consent”
requirements).
38. See, e.g., Summary Report: Early Reproductive Events and Breast
Cancer Workshop, NAT’L CANCER INST., (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.
cancer.gov/cancer topics/causes/ere/workshop-report (last updated Jan. 12, 2010)
(last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (evaluating evidence on reproductive events and
breast cancer, and concluding that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an
increase in breast cancer risk”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1175, 1179–87 (2014) (discussing scientific evidence showing that abortion does
not cause mental health problems).
39. Susan A. Cohen, New Data on Abortion Incidence, Safety Illuminate
Key Aspects of Worldwide Abortion Debate, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2, 4
(2007).
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regulation of abortion providers and facilities, also known as
TRAP laws, are based on the false assertion that abortion is
poorly regulated and performed in an unsafe manner.40 An
example of such a law is the Texas requirement that abortion
providers have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.41 This
restriction wrongly implies that abortion patients will often end
up in emergency rooms and that most other providers of
outpatient procedures have such admitting privileges.42 TRAP
laws ignore that abortion is not only exceptionally safe but is one
of the most heavily regulated of medical procedures.43 If the
public accepts the false factual assertions made in support of
these restrictions, they may support them because they believe
they are really protecting women.
Another possible explanation for the public’s support of
incremental restrictions has more to do with the vague pro-life
rhetoric denouncing abortion. This rhetoric fuels imprecise,
poorly thought-out moral impressions: Abortion is bad. We are
not sure exactly why, but we know that it’s morally questionable
in some way. Therefore, women who get abortions must also be
bad. Likewise, abortion providers must be shady and out to make
money by preying on women. Many of the incremental
restrictions feed into this generalized disapproval of abortion.
TRAP laws are needed to rein in the crooked abortion providers.
Waiting periods are needed because pregnant women are
irresponsible and need to be forced to reflect on the gravity of
their behavior.
In fact, much opposition to abortion seems rooted in a belief
that abortion encourages or excuses women’s sexual
40. See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political
Traction While Abortion Clinics—and the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, 16
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 7, 7, 11–12 (2013) (explaining that TRAP laws often use
concern for public health to conceal an actual purpose of making abortions less
accessible to the public).
41. H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
42. See Planned Parenthood of Wisc., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786,
797–99 (7th Cir. 2013) (questioning the medical justification for Wisconsin’s
admitting privileges requirement).
43. See Gold & Nash, supra note 40, at 7–8 (explaining that abortion in the
United States has consistently been an extremely safe medical procedure and
that it has been highly regulated by the states).
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irresponsibility. Abortion is an easy way out for licentious or rash
behavior. People may also find unsettling or off-putting the idea
that a pregnant woman would reject motherhood.44 Enduring the
burdens of pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting is how women
can make amends for poor choices about sex. Incremental
restrictions fit this pattern. Many of these restrictions seem
intended to make abortion less “easy” or appealing for women by
imposing burdens that we do not impose when a woman chooses
childbirth.45 Spousal or parental notice requirements suggest that
women are not capable of making a responsible decision on their
own, and that they cannot be trusted to consult family members
voluntarily. Funding bans ensure that poor women bear the
financial consequences of their irresponsible behavior. Preabortion ultrasound mandates amount to a kind of shaming
process in which women’s own bodies are used to show them the
visual evidence of their guilt.46
The theme of women’s irresponsibility also explains the
popularity of certain exceptions to abortion bans. Polling shows
that the public is most sympathetic to abortion in cases of serious
endangerment of the woman’s health, grave fetal anomalies, and
rape or incest.47 What all of these have in common are
circumstances beyond the woman’s control.48 Health crises and
fetal anomalies offer reasons for the abortion besides an easy way
out from the burdens of motherhood. They suggest that the
woman would embrace her pregnancy if only she could. They also
44. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 409, 414 (2013) (arguing that a “principal driver of abortion disgust” is
“the idea that women would renounce motherhood given the opportunity to
embrace it”).
45. See Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th, supra note 17, at 259–60.
46. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed
Bodily Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (“Sonogram
requirements threaten a woman’s sense of autonomy over her bodily decisionmaking by giving no weight to her right to refuse. The woman has done (or is
about to do something) bad, and so she forfeits her right to the inviolability of
her body.”).
47. See BOWMAN & RUGG, supra note 21, at 12 (illustrating that, generally,
a majority of the population believes abortion should be legal under certain
circumstances such as when the pregnancy is the result of rape).
48. See id. (noting that a majority of the population would allow abortion in
three situations completely out of the mother’s control).
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show that, while we expect women to bear the burdens of
pregnancy, childbirth, and perhaps parenting, there are some
burdens we think are too much. Cases of rape and incest
demonstrate most vividly the theme of irresponsibility or
culpability. Women who become pregnant as a result of voluntary
sex are guilty. They caused their own predicament. Women who
were raped are innocent. To make them bear the burdens of
pregnancy and childbirth would be unfair.
These inferences, of course, are just that. It is hard to know
exactly how the public feels about abortion restrictions because
the people pushing for these restrictions are not the general
public. The point of the incrementalist strategy is to increase
opposition to abortion no matter the reasons.49 This is where we
see the vague rhetoric against abortion weakening our public
debate. We see public policy being formed based on simplistic
declarations unmoored from the inevitably more nuanced facts.50
Normally, we should diagnose what social problem we are trying
to fix before we decide how to fix it. Instead, abortion restrictions
are enacted based on disingenuous sound bites and factual
falsehoods that activists advance and the media dutifully repeats.
The congressional legislation to ban abortions at twenty weeks of
pregnancy—passed by the House in June 2013 and introduced by
Senator Lindsey Graham in November 2013—is a perfect
illustration of this.51 The ban is based on the scientifically
dubious claim that fetuses can feel pain at twenty weeks.52
49. Memorandum from Bopp & Coleson, supra note 33, at 5 (advising that
“[t]he pro-life movement must at present avoid fighting on the more difficult
terrain of its own position, namely arguing that abortion should not be available
in cases of rape, incest, fetal deformity, and harm to the mother,” but
acknowledging moral inconsistency exceptions for these cases).
50. See MORRIS FIORINA, DISCONNECT: THE BREAKDOWN OF REPRESENTATION
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 73 (2009) (“Facts give way to ideology. Facts consistent
with one’s position are emphasized, and those that are inconsistent are ignored
or denied altogether. And if inaccurate or distorted information makes ordinary
people believe such claims of no common ground, the potential for positive
political action declines.”).
51. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong.
(2013) (prohibiting performance of abortion in most circumstances if the
probable age of the fetus is twenty weeks or older); Pain-Capable Unborn Child
Protection Act, S. 1670, 113th Cong. (2013) (same).
52. See, e.g., Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary
Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947, 947 (2005) (concluding that
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Senator Graham intimated that, by this stage of pregnancy, “you
become you.”53 At the same time, both the House and Senate
versions contain exceptions for rape and incest, exceptions wholly
inconsistent with the entire premise of the bans.54
This is no way to do public policy. Obviously, we ought not to
be passing laws based on false factual premises. And the
judgments about women that I have just described are equally
troubling as bases for legislation. Why are these moral judgments
about women not permissible foundations for law? First, the law
must be based on reason. We ought to demand consistency in our
laws. We cannot say that here an embryo has value and here it
does not. Second, to try to codify moral judgments this nuanced is
a hopeless task.55 The law is a blunt instrument, and we will
often find that it produces unfair results. For example, who are
we to presume that women having an abortion are rejecting
motherhood, when the majority already are mothers, and when
many are doing it precisely to protect existing children, or to be
able to have children when they are financially able?56 And
finally, whatever moral opinions we have about whether women
are making a good decision are overridden by a far more
important moral imperative: honoring the dignity and autonomy
of women.
Women choosing abortion are indeed making a moral
decision. They are making a decision that reflects significant,
conscientious deliberation over how best to govern their lives. Far
“fetal perception of pain is unlikely before the third trimester”).
53. Mario Trujillo, Graham Readies 20-Week Abortion Ban, THE HILL (Nov.
23, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/abortion/189067graham-proud-to-lead-20-week-abortion-fight-in-senate (last visited Jan. 8,
2014) (“I am proud to lead this charge. This is a debate worthy of a great
democracy. When do you become you: at twenty weeks of a pregnancy? What is
the proper role of the government in protecting that child?” (quotations
omitted)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, H.R. 1797, 113th Cong.
(2013) (providing that the twenty-week ban will not apply if “the pregnancy is
the result of rape, or the result of incest against a minor”); Pain-Capable Unborn
Child Protection Act, S. 1670, 113th Cong. (2013) (same).
55. See Borgmann, The Meaning, supra note 3, at 603–07.
56. See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES (2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.pdf (“About
sixty-one percent of abortions are obtained by women who have one or more
children.”).
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from being irresponsible, women choosing abortion are doing so
because they believe it is the most responsible decision they can
make. However we may feel about the fact that a woman is
unintentionally pregnant—and let us not forget that a man
helped cause that predicament—we ought to applaud her for
making the most prudent decision she can in light of that
circumstance. At the very least, we should respect her right to
make that decision. We allow people to make important moral
decisions in other contexts, even if we don’t agree. For example,
we allow people to decide to have another child when they
already have many, and when the new child might stretch the
family’s resources and ability to provide for their existing
children. We might have a moral opinion about this, but we do
not think it should be made illegal.
Let us consider where Roe v. Wade comes down on the issue
of women’s autonomy. Criticism of Roe has become commonplace
even among some liberal legal scholars.57 My purpose here is not
to defend Roe’s reasoning or its stated rationales. Rather, I would
like to examine the frameworks of Roe and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and the extent to which they
advance or inhibit women’s autonomy and dignity.
The Roe opinion may lionize doctors, but Roe’s framework
protected women’s autonomy by leaving to them the decision
whether to continue a pregnancy, up until the point of fetal
viability. Fetal viability marked the earliest moment when the
state could impose its moral view of abortion on the woman.58
Before this, a state could regulate abortion only to protect
women’s health, and the strict scrutiny standard ensured that

57. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (agreeing with the principles behind Roe and
indicating they would be valid if enacted by legislation, but offering several
critiques of the Roe opinion); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 131, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=990968 (discussing
legal scholars who have credited Roe with provoking a popular backlash against
abortion rights).
58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at
viability.”).
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disingenuous claims to protect women’s health would be ferreted
out.59
Now, the governing framework is the undue burden standard
established by Casey,60 as further interpreted by Gonzales v.
Carhart.61 These decisions have weakened protection for women’s
autonomy in two ways. First, they have expanded the permissible
reasons a state may regulate abortion before viability to include
moral opposition to abortion.62 In addition, the scrutiny applied to
such regulation has been weakened from strict scrutiny to the
undue burden standard.63 The Court in Gonzales v. Carhart paid
extraordinary deference to congressional fact-finding, applying
the undue burden standard in a manner that allows states and
pro-life advocates to promote and defend abortion restrictions
based on disingenuous reasons and misrepresentations of the
facts.64 Casey and Carhart have thus helped to impoverish our
public debate about abortion. These decisions have encouraged
superficial, unthoughtful treatment of the abortion issue.
Abortion is cheap ethics. It allows us to point our finger from
the comfort of our chairs, without putting a lot of thought into the
issue and without making sacrifices. It is much less satisfying to
see abortion as a nuanced, complex moral decision not well suited
to bright legal line-drawing. It is harder to acknowledge that the
problems affecting women that truly cry out for our attention are
daunting issues like poverty, job discrimination, racism,
homophobia, rape, and domestic violence. But it has been forty
years since Roe v. Wade was decided. This country is not at war
59. Id.; see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 75–79 (1976) (striking down ban on saline amniocentesis method of
abortion, which the legislature claimed was necessary to protect women’s
health).
60. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
61. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
62. See id. at 156–60 (providing the congressional justifications for the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking
Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675,
680–82, 689–95 (2004) [hereinafter Borgmann, Winter Count] (discussing
Casey’s expansion of permissible justifications for pre-viability abortion
restrictions).
63. See Borgmann, Winter Count, supra note 62, at 680–89 (discussing the
significance of the undue burden standard).
64. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous
Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15 (2008).
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over that decision. This country is ready to move on, to attend to
the unfinished task of ensuring that all women are treated as
full, equal, and respected members of our society. Let us turn our
attention to that charge.

